Introduction
Expected utility has been the received theory of individual decision making under risk, where probabilities are known beforehand, and under uncertainty, where probabilities are not known beforehand. Its validity was however called into question due to the paradoxes ofAllais and Ellsberg. These paradoxes have led to the development of various alternative theories. There are two main directions in the literature on axiomatic non-expected utility theories-the rank-dependent direction and the betweenness direction. Betweenness, the common characterizing property of the latter direction, requires that the preference for a probability mixture of two lotteries be between those two lotteries. The betweemress direction originated with weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983; Fishburn, 1983) , followed by Dekel (1986) , Hazen (1987) , Chew (1989) , Gul (1991) , and others. The betweenness literature has concentrated on decision making under risk, and does not provide an account of the Ellsberg paradox.
We focus on the other main direction, the rank-dependent direction, that originated with Quiggin ( 1982) and Schmeidler (1989) . The rank-dependent theories have a number of appealing features. While expected utility has often been criticized for modeling risk attitudes solely through the valuation of outcomes, the rank-dependent models incorporate the influence of the perception of risk and uncertainty. Further, they have tractable fimctional forms and explain both the Allais and the Ellsberg paradoxes.
Savage's sure-thing principle is directly violated by the Allais paradox in the context of risk, and by the Ellsberg paradox in the context of uncertainty. This article proposes a weakening of Savage's sure-thing principle, called the comonotonic sure-thing principle or comonotonic independence axiom, which essentially restricts Savage's sure-thing pi-inciple to comonotonic acts, i.e., acts that induce the same ordering on the states of nature in terms of the associated outcomes. We will use both labels interchangeably noting that the comonotonic sure-thing principle label is clearer in linking its content with the surething principle, while comonotonic independence is simpler and avoids the connotation associated with the term "sure-thing."
We identify the comonotonic independence axiom as the common characterizing property that underlies the rank-dependent direction. We characterize comonotonic independence in full generality by means of a new functional form called cumulative utility (CU). The axiomatizations currently provided in the literature suppose various conditions, none directly weakening Savage's sure-thing principle, and all stronger than comonotonic independence. The derivations of most of those results can be simplified through the results of this article; see table 1 in section 5. In particular, by dropping separability of belief and utility, CU generalizes Choquet expected utility, as well as cumulative prospect theory (rank-and sign-dependent utility theory). A more detailed discussion of the literature is provided in section 5.
The rank-dependent generalization of Savage's expected utility to Choquet expected utility became possible when a proper generalization of additive integrals was understood, in Quiggin (1982) for the special case of decision making under risk, and, independently, in Schmeidler (1989) for the general case. This generalization is the Choquet integral introduced by Choquet (1954) . In section 4, the form introduced in this article, the CU-functional, is shown to be a genuine generalization of the Choquet integral, satisfying natural conditions such as monotonicity, linearity within comonotonic subsets, and supnorm continuity. The latter is less restrictive than weak continuity, popularly used in decision making under risk and in statistics, and yields convenient necessary and sufficient conditions in the main theorems; see Observation 4.2. It only employs structure on the outcomes, and does not impose any restriction on the state space, which may be finite, infinite, contain atoms, or be atomless.
Section 2 presents some notation. Section 3 presents the representation theorem for simple acts. The main theorem, dealing with nonsimple acts, is given in section 4. Section 5 relates our result to the literature. Table 1 illustrates that the CU-characterization generalizes not only the existing rank-dependent characterizations for uncertainty, where no rank-linear forms had as yet been axiomatized but also generalizes existing results for the context of risk, For risk, rank-linear forms had been proposed before. Besides generalizing the existing results, we provide a direct proof that avoids some mathematical problems that occurred in the literature; these are discussed or referenced in section 5. Appendix A gives proofs and appendix B generalizes the results to connected topological spaces.
Notation
Let 11 be the state space, endowed with an algebra &. Elements of & are called events. As consequence space we take the real line R. (The appendix will generalize to connected topological spaces, e.g., any convex subset of R"'.) F is the set of all acts, i.e., measurable functions (the inverse of every interval is an event) from R to R. We denote by f-*x the act assigning x to all w E A and f(o) to all 6~ E A", and by f-,4,g,y the act assigning x to all w E A, y to all o E B, and f(w) to all w E A' n B'. Here A,B are disjoint events. A function v : s4 -+ [O,l] is a cupaci@ if v(0) = 0, LJ(L!) = 1, and $4 U B) 2 v(A) for all A,B E tie; capacities are nonadditive generalizations of probability measures. I1 = (A,, ., A,,) is an ordered partition, or partition for short (the usual unordered partitions will not occur in this article}, if A ,, ., A,, are mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of R. It is always assumed that the A/'s are events. We write U'(n) for UJ=, .4,; U'(n) = 0; we often suppress rj. F" is the set of acts of the form XI'= I xjlA, (1, is the indicator function); whenever we use this notation, it is implicitly understood that the A$ are disjoint. Note that the set F" does not depend on the ordering of events in Il. F'i is the subset of F" for which x, 5 ... 2 x,,; here obviously the ordering of events in II does matter. The set F' of simple acts is the union of F" over all partitions n; F" denotes the set of all bounded acts.
We are concerned with a preference relation > on a set of acts; the exact domain of Z= will be specified below. A function cp represents + ifq is a function from the domain of 3 to R such that [f 3 g e cp(f) 5 p(g)]. If a representing function exists, then & is a weak order, i.e., it is complete [VJ g : f ?= g or g 3 f] and transitive.
Cumulative utility for simple acts
This and the following section characterize CU theory in terms of properties of >. CU employs an outcome-dependent capacity, i.e., a function W : R X d -+ R satisfying (i) V,4 E ti : W(O,A) = 0, (ii) Vx f 0, W(x,sZ) # 0, and (iii) Vx # 0, W(x;)/W(x,Q) is a capacity. In this section, we restrict attention to the set F of simple acts. A representing function on F is a cumulative utility (Cv) functional if there exists an outcome-dependent capacity W such that the function is of the form
The most well-known special case is subjective expected utility (SEU). It corresponds to W(x,A) = P(A)u(x), where P is a probability measure and II a utility function. An intermediate special case is Choquet expected utility (CEU), where W(x,A) = v(A)u(x), with v being a capacity instead of a probability measure. Note the central role of events of the form U', describing the occurrence of a fixed outcome .yi or anything better. That is, these events are "cumulative." This explains the term cumulative utility. One may interpret V as an event-dependent utility, i.e., the natural rank-dependent analogue of state-dependent utility. To generalize Choquet expected utility (the case where W&4) = v(A)+) above) to incorporate state-dependence of utility, one can write W(x,A) = v(A)u,(x), where u,(e) now depends on the event A. Then, however, with preferences over acts as the only empirical primitive, the factorization v(A)u,(.) becomes meaningless. Only the product W&4) = v(A)u,&) can be derived from preferences. Thus, the result of this article may be interpreted as a generalization of CEU that allows for state-dependent utility. Under CU, the outcome-dependent capacity and the functional in (1) on F are said to be associated with each other.
Actsfand g are comonotonic if there exist no states o, w' such thatf(o) >f(o') and g(w) <c g(w'). That is,fand g order the states of nature the same way in terms of the appeal of the assigned outcomes. A set of acts is comonotonic if the acts are pairwise comonotonic. We say that & satisfies comonotonic independence (comonotonic sure-thing principle) on F if f-AX +g-,xwf-,y+g-,y (3) for alIf_, x, g-, x, f-A y, g-, y which are comonotonic. Observe that if the latter acts are not required to be comonotonic, then (3) is equivalent to Savage's sure-thing principle. Comonotonic independence weakens Savage's sure-thing principle by requiring the four involved acts to be comonotonic. It is apparent that comonotonic independence is compatible with both the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg paradox. Motivations have been provided in Yaari (1987) , Schmeidler (1989) , Wakker (1990a) , and other articles. Schmeidler (1989) uses the term comonotonic independence for independence with respect to probabilistic mixing; in his model, consequences are probability distributions over a set of prizes. Our condition is the natural weakening of his condition to the setting in which a probabilistic mixture operation is not available. It can be seen (Wakker, 1989, Lemma VI.3. 3) that the simple acts in (3) are comonotonic if and only if they are contained in one set F:.
The following lemma prepares for the main theorem. Its proof is given immediately because it illustrates the CU functional. Together with Corollary 1, it shows that comonotonic independence underlies all rank-dependent models.
Lemma 1 . + satisfies comonotonic independence on F whenever it can be represented by a CU functional.
Proof Let Ciijfil,, + xl,, 3 xi+jgil,, + xl,!. Further, letf, 2 ... 'Jfi-, 2 x z&, 2 ... 2 f,, the same with g instead ofJ; and/or with JJ instead of x. Substitute -g V(j-, u', W) + V(x, U', W') 2 z vg,, u', u'-') + Vb, u, @'I?
and replace the common term V(x,ui,W-') by V@,ti,cy'-'). Note that this reasoning could only be applied because the acts are comonotonic, and so can be related to one same set fl. 0
Another way to understand the result of the above lemma is to observe that CU gives an additive representation within each set F!!; see (2). That implies the usual independence within each fl, i.e., comonotonic independence for simple acts.
We say that 3 satisfies pointwise monotonicity on a general set of acts G, if for all acts Jg E G : [VW E R : f(o) 2 g(o)] +f B g. For simple acts however, we need to develop a stronger definition of monotonicity. An event A is inessential ifs-g for all simple acts f and g that coincide on A". Essential is the opposite of inessential. We call 3 joint<v monotonic on F' if, for all simple acts f and essential events A, b > x tif-,+y > fdAx]. In CU, joint monotonicity implies monotonicity with respect to outcomes as well as with respect to event inclusion; in decision making under risk, it is equivalent to stochastic dominance (see section 5). Pointwise monotonicity follows on F' as an elementary consequence of joint monotonicity, transitivity, and completeness.
Continuity will be related to the supremum norm: 3 is continuous on F" if for each j z g in F" there exists 6 > 0 such that for all h in F; : ([Vo E R : f(w) -h(w)1 < 61 a h > g), and ([VW E R : I&w) -g(w)1 < 61 +f> h). For an outcome-dependent capacity W : R X ti -+ R and the CU functional on F" associated with W, we use the following analogous conditions. W satisfies joint monotonici@ if y > x =+ V@B,A) > V(x,B,A) whenever BL4 is essential. CU is continuous on F if for each f E F" and each E > 0 there exists 6 > 0 such that for all h E F" : [Vo E fl : If(w) -h(o)1 < 61 * Km(f) -CU(h)l < E. Note that this implies continuity of W(-,A) for each A. Finally, a function is a ratio scale if it is unique up to a positive factor. The following theorem characterizes CU on the simple acts. Theorem 1. Suppose there exist three disjoint essential events. The following two statements are equivalent for + on F.
(i) + is represented by for x, 2 '.. 2 x,, where W : R X ti -+ R is an outcome-dependent capacity that is continuous in the first argument and jointly monotonic.
(ii) + satisfies transitivity, completeness, joint monotonicity, (supnorm-) continuity, and comonotonic independence (comonotonic sure-thing principle).
Further, given (i) or (ii), CU is (supnorm-)continuous, and the functions W and CU are ratio scales.
A detailed proof of the theorem is given in the appendix. We give here some comments on the proof of the most difficult implication, (ii) 3 (i). (ii) implies that within each comonotonic subset e, the regular sure-thing principle holds. This principle is identical to the independence condition proposed in Debreu (1960) shown to be necessary and sufficient for additive representation on full product sets. Here we need the extension of Debreu's result to comonotonic sets. This extension is nontrivial, and was provided by Wakker (1993a) . Next the additive representations on comonotonic subsets must be "glued together" into one overall CU-functional that is defined on the set F" of simple acts. For example, the additive representations must be made to coincide on the diagonal of constant acts; the required derivation turns out to be rather complicated. The "gluing together" of additive representations within different comonotonic subsets, the main problem in the proof, is trivially satisfied in the context of decision making under risk. It shows why our result for uncertainty is more complicated than existing results for risk.
Cumulative utility for nonsimple acts
This section extends the results of the previous section to Fh, the set of bounded acts. The definitions of comonotonicity, as well as continuity for & and functionals CU, are extended to Fb in a straightforward manner. For simplicity, the definitions of (in)essentiality (and joint monotonicity as based on it) will not be changed i.e., they are only related to simple acts. (In the presence of proper monotonicity, this can be seen to be equivalent to alternative definitions of (in)essentiality, related to larger sets of acts.) Joint monotonicity of + will only be imposed on F"; whether Statement (i) in Theorem 2 implies joint monotonicity of > on the entire set p is an open question. Comonotonic ipidependence holds on Fh if (3) holds for all comonotonic acts in F'. For the extension to nonsimple acts, certainty equivalents are important; for an act, the certainty equivalent is the constant act/outcome equivalent to that act. Lemma 2. Suppose + satisfies joint monotonicity on F, and transitivity, completeness, and continuity on p. Then, for eachf E Fh, there exists a certainty equivalent.
If a CU functional as characterized in Theorem 1 is given on F", then, under the conditions of the above lemma, we can, for any f E Fh, define CU( f) as the CU-value of the certainty equivalent ofJ: Obviously this definition will only be useful if CU is a genuine generalization of integrals. That is, given boundedness, CU(f) should be the limit of CU values of converging simple acts. This is guaranteed by continuity, together with the well-known denseness (with respect to the supnorm) of the simple acts in p. As a consequence (derived below), CU-on-p inheritspointwise monotonicity, natural for (generalized) integrals, from C&on-F : [V w : Ao) 2 g(w)] * CU(f) 2 CL&). Another property that CU-on-p inherits from (X-on-P is comonotonic independence for the represented preference relation. This is crucial as comonotonic independence is at the core of the rank-dependent stream, and of this article. The property follows directly from the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that CU : Fb + R is continuous, and is associated with an outcomedependent capacity on F. Then CU satisfies pointwise monotonicity, and CU(f) -CU(g) = CU(.f') -CU(g') for all comonotonic actsJg,f',g' satisfying: Vo E R,
Actually, a somewhat stronger condition than comonotonic independence follows for a preference relation represented by a CU-functional as in the above lemma. It says that, given comonotonicity, not only one or finitely many common outcomes can be changed without affecting preference, but rather any arbitrary number: Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Lemma 3, the binary relation a, represented by CU, satisfies the following condition: For all comonotonic f;g,f',g' satisfying (4), If+ g af k g']. Consequently, ?= satisfies comonotonic independence.
Sometimes in the literature stronger formulations for independence conditions, such as in the above corollary, have been used where an infinite number of common outcomes may be replaced. Also Savage (1954) used this stronger formulation for his sure-thing principle. The above corollary shows, in combination with Observation 1 below, that the alternative definition and ours are equivalent for continuous CU, thus for most rankdependent models in the literature; also in Savage (1954) , restriction of the sure-thing principle to simple acts would have sufficed to imply it in general (see Wakker, 1993b) . Theorem 2. Suppose there exist three disjoint essential events. The following two statements are equivalent for 3 on Fh, the set of bounded acts:
(i) > is represented by a (supnorm-)continuous functional CU. On F", CU is associated with a jointly monotonic outcome-dependent capacity W, i.e., for x, 2 ... 2 x,,.
(ii) 3 satisfies joint monotonicity on P, transitivity, completeness, (supnorm-)continuity, and comonotonic independence (comonotonic sure-thing principle).
Next some observations and modifications are given.
Observation 1 Instead of Fh, any set of acts X with F C X C p could have been taken as domain.
The next observation is another illustration that supnorm continuity is not very restrictive.
Observation 2. Under SEU and CEU, (supnorm-)continuity of the representing functional is equivalent to continuity of the utility function.
The representation of Theorem 2 can be extended to unbounded acts with finite CUvalue, in a way similar to definitions of integrals. Supnorm-continuity then is to be restricted to Fb. For act f, the truncation f," is u if f is less/equal u, it is f if f is between u and p , and it is p iff is greater/equal p. For any unbounded act f, the usual integrals are defined as limits of integrals of truncations off: Analogously, if the limit of the certainty equivalents of the truncations fup (u going to -00, p to 00) exists and is real, then we can extend the definition of the CU functional to f by defining CU(f) as the CU-value of the mentioned limit of certainty equivalents. Here the condition must be imposed on the preference relation that f is equivalent to the mentioned limit of certainty equivalents.
Representations of unbounded acts in rank-dependent models have been discussed in Chew and Epstein (1989a, end of section 4), Wakker (1993b) , and Nakamura (I 992b).
Specializations of cumulative utility
This section presents the implications of Theorem 2 for the recent literature on rankdependent preferences. We first show how, in general, decision making under risk can be considered a special case of decision making under uncertainty in which probabilities are known beforehand. In this case, a probability measure P on R is given, and each act f induces a probability distribution Fr : x H P(f 5 x) on the outcome space R. An act f stochastically dominates another act g if F,. (x) 5 F,(x) for all outcomes x. We require 3 to satisfy stochastic dominance in the sense thatf 3 g wheneverf stochastically dominates g, and f > g if furthermore Ff # F,. It follows that different acts inducing the same probability distribution over outcomes are indifferent. It is then customary not to make explicit the underlying state space but rather to assume that it is rich enough to generate all (countably additive) probability distributions on R. An example of such a state space is [O,l] endowed with the uniform distribution on the Bore1 subsets. Then, as is wellknown, for any probability distribution, there exists a random variable/act that generates it. Table 1 presents the rank-dependent forms for simple acts xJZl x,1+,, with X, > ... > xn; the extension to general acts has been given in section 4. The forms to the right concern decision making under uncertainty in full generality; the forms to the left concern decision making under risk. In the latter case, the (objective) probabilities P(A,) are abbreviated as p,. CU was defined before; RLU (rank-linear utility) is the special case in which W(x,A) = $(x,&A)) for a function + satisfying +(x,0) = 0, and for all )' > x and q > p,
Condition (5) is equivalent to stochastic dominance, and is the analogue of joint monotonicity in CU (see Lemma 4 below). CEU (Choquet expected utility) corresponds to the case where w(x,A) = u(x)v(A), where v is a capacity; let us repeat that W' abbreviates #=, Ai. RDEU (rank-dependent expected utility) is the special case of CEU in which v = cp o P, for a known probability measure P and a strictly increasing function cp with q(O) = 0, cp( 1) = 1; stochastic dominance implies that u is strictly increasing. SEU (subjective expected utility) corresponds to CEU where the capacity v is additive, i.e., it is a (subjective) probability measure. EU (expected utility) is the special case of SEU in which the subjective probability measure coincides with a known objective probability measure P. RDEU originated with Quiggin (1982) . See also Yaari ( 1987) , Chew (1990) , Nakamura ( 1992a), and Wakker { 1994) . CEU was initiated by Schmeidler (1989; first version, 1982) with refinements by Gilboa (1987) , Lute (1988) , Nakamura (1990 Nakamura ( , 1992a , Wakker (1989, Theorem VI.5 . I), Sarin and Wakker (1992) and Chew and Kami (1993) . RLU was first proposed in Segal (1989, Theorem 1; first version, 1984 ) (see also Wakker, 1993~; Segal, 1993.) Green and Jullien (1988) gave sufficient conditions for this form. Chew and Epstein (1989a) gave necessary and sufficient conditions (see also Chew, Epstein, and Wakker, 1992) . Our result is more general, because, first, it can be formulated for connected topological outcome spaces (see appendix B), and second, the imposed continuity restrictions are weaker.
We obtain the following generalization of Wakker (1990b): The following lemma shows how RLLJ can be derived from CU. Thus, in conjunction with Theorem 2, the lemma provides a characterization of RLU. Here it should be noted that, for decision making under risk, stochastic dominance implies joint monotonicity of the preference relation, thus of the CU form. The requirement that P be atomless is necessary and sufficient for the possibility to generate all probability distributions on R.
Lemma 4. Suppose P is an atomless countably additive probability measure on a. Under CU, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) + satisfies stochastic dominance.
(ii) RLU holds.
Proof: (ii) immediately implies (i). So we suppose that (i) holds, and derive (ii). Under stochastic dominance, the equality P(A) = P(B) implies, for all x 2 y, the indifference xl, + ~1,~ w xl, + ~1,~. The ordinal independence 'condition of Green and Jullien (1988) is weaker than comonotonic independence. In Theorem 1, however, comonotonic independence can be weakened to the following condition, the equivalent of ordinal independence of Green and Jullien: f-AX * g-A E @f-A y + g-, y (6) where either x and y are maximal outcomes, or minimal outcomes. This condition implies comonotonic independence in the presence of the other conditions of Theorem 2, by reasonings analogous to Gorman's (1968) . (Further details will be given in Remark Al.') Quiggin (1989, Proposition 4) and Ebert ( 1988a,b ) also obtained such representations for simple probability distributions. Due to symmetry, in RLU, only nondecreasing random variables from [O,l] to R need to be considered so that the additive representation only has to be derived on one maximal comonotonic set. The process in the proof of Theorem 1 of fitting together the additive representations from different comonotonic sets through certainty equivalents into one overall additive representation can thus be skipped for RLU. Hence its derivations are considerably simpler. (Wakker (1991 (Wakker ( , 1993a pointed out mathematical problems for the derivations of RLU. Also, Chateauneuf (1990) 
Cumulative prospect theory, introduced in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is a special case of CU with W(x,B) = v+(B)u(x) for x L 0, and W&B) = v (B)u(x) for x < 0. (See also Wakker and Tversky, 1993 .) The preference functional used in cumulative prospect theory appeared also in Starmer and Sugden ( 1989) and Lute and Fishburn (1991) . It modifies the earlier prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979) by adopting RDEU or CEU forms, and presupposes a status quo-the zero outcome-relative to which gains and losses are defined.
Within CU, we may extend the notion of a status quo to a normal region [u,u] of outcomes within which behavior conforms to the prescriptions of expected utility. Only when extreme outcomes are involved may the implications of expected utility be violated. This can be modeled by: For x E [u,u], W(x,A) = u(x)P(A), i.e., coincides with expected utility; for x < u, W&A) = u(x)v(A); for x > p, W(x,A) = u(.r)v'(A), where v and v' are capacities, v(v') pertains to the perception of uncertainty when excessively low (high) outcomes are involved.
Next we suggest an application of the CU functional proposed in this article to robust statistics. There, the L-estimator corresponds to RDEU with u(x) = x (Huber, 198 1; Chew and Epstein, 198913) . A commonly used special case is the a-trimmed mean consisting of the arithmetic mean after trimming the (Y fractions of the highest and the lowest observations. One can be critical of trimmed means for indiscriminately discarding outliers, even when these turn out to be moderate. It seems prudent to determine a normal region [u,u] and trim for outliers only if they are outside this region. Such an estimator corcesponds to: For x E [u,u], W(x,A) = x&4), i.e., coincides with expected value, for x < u, W&4) = xcp(P(A)) where cp is continuous on [O,l] 
SUPNORM-CONTINUITY
OF CU: As a preparation we consider (supnorm-) continuity of cu.
Lemma Al. If W is jointly monotonic, then continuity of W in its first argument is equivalent to continuity on F" of the functional CU associated with W.
ProoJ If CU is continuous, then continuity of W&A) in x follows from continuity of CU(x1, + ~1,~) in X, for y < x. Next suppose W is continuous in its first argument. To demonstrate the continuity of CU, let fj be a sequence of simple acts, converging in supnorm to the simple act5 We shall only prove liminf CU(f:) 2 CU(f ). We can write f as zy=, xii,,, with x, > ... > x,. Let gj be the simple act xy=, yjl,, where y( is the minimum of xi and infCfk(w) : k 2 j, w E Ai}. Then also these acts g' converge in supnorm, monotonically from below, toJ: By taking j large enough, y( > > y," can be guaranteed, so that then all g' are in the same fl asf; with ll = (A,, . . ., A,). By continuity in x, for each i, of W(x,U'), consequently of each V(x,Ui,Uim'), CU(g') converges to CU(j). Repeated application of joint monotonicity implies pointwise monotonocity of CU on F, so that CV(f') 2 CU(gj) for all j. Hence liminf CU(f') 2 liminf CU(g') = CU(f 1.
cl
The above lemma also shows that, on F", (supnorm-) continuity in the presence of joint monotonicity is equivalent to the usual (Euclidean) "finite-dimensional" continuities imposed within each F", so is not very restrictive.
IMPLICATION (i) * (ii):
To derive (i) + (ii) in Theorem 1, assume (i) holds. Comonotonic independence has been derived in Lemma 1. Transitivity and completeness are direct. Continuity of > follows from the continuity of CU as established above. For joint monotonicity of 3, consider the simple act c:= ,x,l,,+zl,, for x, > ... > x,, A essential, and (A,, ., A,) an ordered partition of A'. It suffices to show that the CU-value of this simple act is a strictly increasing function of z. On (-~,.x,J, it is because I'@, A U (U"), U") is, on [xj+,,xjJ, because V(z,A U (U'),U') is, and on [x,, co), because V(z,A, 0) is.
IMPLICATION (ii) + (i):
Now we turn to the most difficult part of the proof. We suppose (ii) holds, and derive (i). Since + satisfies the usual continuity and monotonicity conditions within each p, we get: Lemma A2. For each f E F there exists a certainty equivalent (defined in section 4).
We call one ordered partition (A,, ., A,,) an ordered refinement of another ordered partition (B,, ., B,) if A, is B, U B, U ... U B,, , A, is B,, + , U B,, +z U . U Bk2, etc. Again, because this article only deals with ordered partitions, we shall suppress "ordered" everywhere. Note that thus (A,, A,, A3) is not a refinement of (A2 U A,, A,). The following simple observations concerning essentiality of events can easily be verified: If A is essential, then so is each superset.
(AlI IfA is essential, and (A i , . . ., A,) is a partition of A, then at least one Ai is essential. (A9 For each partition, there exists a refinement containing at least three essential events.
For (A3), intersect each element of the partition with each of the three disjoint essential events as required in Theorem 1, and with the complement of the union of those three events. Then apply (A2) with each of those three events in the role of A. For every partition II containing at least three essential events, 2 restricted to fli is a continuous monotonic weak order that satisfies usual independence (CI in Wakker, 1993a) . Hence, by Corollary 3.6 of Wakker (1993a) (the increasingness condition there follows after suppression of inessential coordinates), there exists a cardinal additive representation v": xJ=,x,lA, -~JE,V~'(,xj) on $1. For each inessential Al in II, I$" is constant, and can be taken to be 0; for each essential A, it is strictly increasing in outcome by joint monotonicity. By (A3) and standard uniqueness results (see Wakker, 1993a) , the same holds true for partitions Il with only two essential events. Partitions containing at least two essential events are called essentinl partitions. By (A2), any refinement of an essential partition is again essential. For all essential II, we set v"( 1,)) = 1 and for allj, q'i(O) = 0. Assume now that ll' is a refinement of an essential partition ll. Then the additive representation v"' for ll', when restricted to Fy, provides an additive representation that is alternative to p'. By cardinality, @' differs from the restriction of p" only by scale and location, By our choices of the 0 and 1 levels of the additive representations, v"' must be identical to the restriction of v"'. In other words, we have:
For any essential partition II, the additive representation V"coincides on common domain with the additive representation V"'of any finer partition.
(A4)
The major difficulty in the present proof is to show that the different additive representations for different partitions coincide on the "diagonal" of constant acts: c V," (x) = 2 V,?'(x) for ail outcomes x and essential partitions II and Il'. (A.5) I J We call two essential partitions Il and n' linked, denoted by ll 2 ll', if they assign the same v" = V"'-value to constant acts. Of course, we must prove that all essential partitions are linked. For every essential partition there exists a coarsening that is essential and contains exactly two events. By (A4), the additive representations on the two partitions must be in agreement, so the two partitions are linked. From this it follows that it suffices to prove (A5) for essential partitions containing exactly two events.
Let us consider essential partitions (4,X) and (B,B'), and prove @,A') Y (B,B'). If A tl B is essential, then, since essentiality of A' by (Al) implies essentiality of (A n B)', the partition (A fl B, (A fl B)') is aiso essential; hence, by (A4), we can then link (A,&) 2 (A n B+4v3, sw+4' n F) 2 (A n B, (A n II)') 3 (B n A, Bu, m, 13" n AC) 22 (B,B~).
So, say A n B is inessential. Then, by (A2), essentiality of A implies essentiality of AD, and essentiality of B implies essentiality of BW. So all partitions below are essential:
It remains to be shown that (IQ?') 2 (B",B), where both partitions are essential.
By (A3), there exists a refinement of (B,B') having at least three essential events. If B contains at least two of those essential events, then by (Al) the partition can be chosen of the form (B,, B2, B"). In the other case, B' must contain at least two of those essential events, and the partition can be chosen of the form (B,B,, &) . Say the former case holds. We have (B,B') 2 (B,,B,,B') 2 (B,,(B2 U B')) 2 (B,,B',B*) 3 ((B, U lF), B2) .2 (B', B,, B2) 2 (B',B). Formula (A5) has been established.
With (A5) available, it is easy to show that the additive representations on the sets Fy coincide on common domain, resulting in one overall function, and further to show that this one overall function is representing: Considerf E Fy, g E Fy', II and II' essential.
By Lemma A2, there exists a certainty equivalent x for g. We have f 3 g w f 2=
x w V"(f)rV"(x).
Since by (A5) and the representation on Fy' we have v"(x) = v"'(x) = ti"(g)), we get f> g w v" (f) 2 v"' (g).
(A6)
First, this shows, by setting f = g and reflexivity, that different v"'s coincide on common domain so can be considered the restriction of one function, denoted CU, on F". Note that the union of the F"'s for essential II is A'; every simple act is contained, by (A3), in F" for an essential Il. Second representation of ?= by CU now is immediate from (A6).
Continuing the proof, we proceed to show that CU is of the form as described in table 1. For positive x, we define UNIQUENESS: The only freedom in the construction of CU and W in the above proof was the choice CU( In) = (v"( I,,) =)I. One easily verifies that this could have been any other positive real number, leading to an admissible change in scale. There is no further freedom. Given W(O,A) = W(.x,@) = 0, CU, as well as the additive representations v" within the sets flI (i.e., the restrictions of CU to these sets) in the proof above, we must assign value 0 to the act constant 0. So indeed each of these is unique up to a positive scale. This scale might be thought to depend on F'i, but since the functions must coincide on the constant acts, the scale is independent of pl. Indeed CU, and W as uniquely determined by CU, are ratio scales.
Remark Al. In Theorem I, comonotonic independence can be replaced by ordinal independence (6). Proof: In the proof of Theorem 1, comonotonic independence was used to obtain, through some other results in the literature (Corollary 3.6 in Wakker, 1993a, which in turn is based on Theorem 4a in Walker, 199 1) an additive representation v" on sets F"J . This in turn was based on application of Debreu (1960, Theorem 3) on small Cartesian products (denoted F in the mentioned references) on which comonotonic independence is identical to full-strength independence. Since R is an arc-connected separable topological space, this might as well have been obtained, without any further complication, by (5) and Gorman (1968) instead of by comonotonic independence and Debreu ( 1960) . cl Proof of Lemma 2.
Let f E #. It is well-known that there are sequences of simple acts f', gj, converging to f, monotonically from above and below respectively; so, f(w) 2 f" '(0) 2 flw) 1 g"'(w) 2 g'(o) for allj, w. By Lemma A2, which only needed the conditions of Lemma 2, these simple acts have certainty equivalents, abbreviated CE. By pointwise monotonicity, CE(p) 2 CE( fj' ' ) 2 CE(g'+') L CE(gj) for all i. Let the limits be x, and xx, respectively; obviously x, 2 .Y~. [V' : .x,~ 3 g'] implies xr 3 jY [Vj : fj 3 x,] implies f 2 x,. so x1 = x,q -f: q Proof of Lemma 3.
If f pointwise dominates g, then every simple function pointwise dominated by g is pointwise dominated by f as well. Since CU( f) and CU(g) are supremum of CU-values of pointwise dominated simple acts, CV( f) 2 CU(g) follows.
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For the other condition, let$g,y,g' be comonotonic, and satisfy (4). By Wakker (1989, Lemma VI.3.3.iii) , there exists an ordering ?=' (transitive, complete, antisymmetric: w 2=' w' and w' >' w 3 w = w') of Sz such that, for each act h in vf',g,g'),
w >' w * h(w) 2 h(w').
(AlO)
Each other act h satisfying (AlO) is comonotonic withf;f',g,g'. Let A := {w : f(w) = g(w),f'(w) = g'(w)}. Then for each w E A" :f(w) = f'(w) and g(w) = g'(w). Letf/,f'i, g', g'j be four sequences of simple acts, converging toJf',g, and g', monotonically from below; e.g.,y(w) s f'+'(w) I f(w) for allj,w. They can always be chosen such that they satisfy (AlO) and (4). To wit, suppose that they do not satisfy these conditions. We transfer these properties from A f;f , g, g' to the simple acts as follows. For (AlO), we change each q from Cfj,f)', g', g"} by assigning, to each w, max{hi(w') : w' <' w}. Henceforth,fi, f",g', g" will denote the changed acts. This change has not affected monotonic convergence, in particular, for allj, w, and symbols h =f;f',g,g', still h'(w) 5 n+ '(0) 5 h(o). Observe that all simple acts in question satisfy (A lo), and are comonotonic withJ f;,g,g' This change is called a step towards (AlO). Next, for each w E A, we replace bothf/(w) and gj(w) by their maximum maxv(w),gi(w)}, and analogously replaceyj(w) and g"(w) by their maximum. For each w E A', we replace bothp(w) andf'J(w) by their maximum, and replace g'(w) and gci(w) by their maximum. Again, the changed acts will be denoted as the original ones. This change is called a step towards (4), and again, has not affected monotonic convergence from below. Now also fj = gj and ffJ = g'j on A, and fj = f'j and gj = g!' on A'. I.e.,(4) is satisfied. But (AlO) may now be violated. So we make another step towards (Al 0), then one towards (4), etc., until these steps involve no more change. Each change gives rise to at least one more identity between the outcomes of the simple acts. Since the number of outcomes is finite, after a finite number of steps, the procedure stops, and (AlO) and (4) are satisfied. Substituting the resulting simple acts in the CU form on F" shows that CV( fj) -CV(gj) = CU(f ") -CU(g") for all j : by comonotonicity fj,f", g', gQ belong to one same FT. Il can be refined such that each element is either a subset of A, or of A'. The terms V($, C, D) with CW C A cancel both in CU(f')-CU(gJ) and in CU(f")-CU(g'j); the ones with c\D C A" are identical in these two differences. The resulting equality CU( f')-CU(gj) = CU( f 'j) -CU(g'j) is preserved after taking limits, i.e., CU( f )-CU(g) = CU(f')-CU(g').
Cl Proof of Theorem 2.
IMPLICATION (i) + (ii): Suppose (i) holds. Transitivity, completeness, and continuity, are direct. Joint monotonicity of ?= on F" was already established in Theorem 1. Comonotonic independence was established Corollary 1.
IMPLICATION (ii) 3 (i)
. Suppose (ii) holds. By Theorem 1, there exists an outcomedependent capacity W, jointly monotonic and continuous in outcomes, such that on F" the associated functional represents > By Lemma Al, CU is continuous on E". We define, for anySE Fb, CU(f) = CU( ) x , w ere x is the certainty equivalent outcome/constant act the h existence of which is guaranteed by Lemma 2. Obviously, on F", this definition coincides with CU as already defined there, and obviously CU represents >. It remains to be shown that CU is continuous on Fh. Let the bounded f' converge to the boundedJ: By compactness, it suffices to show that, if CU( fJ) converges, it converges to CU( f ). Suppose this were not the case, say the limit were larger. Then there is an outcome x strictly between that limit and Cc'(f). For large j, then f' > X. But x > J; contradicting continuity of Z=. q Proof of Observation 1.
That CU and W are ratio scales and that W is continuous in outcomes follows from Theorem 1. Pointwise monotonic&y follows from Lemma 3. That continuity uniquely determines the extension of CU from F to Fh follows from the denseness of the simple acts.
The only implication of comonotonic independence used in the proof of (ii) ti (i) was its restriction to Ep. For the extension of F to Fh, it was not used. Corollary 1 shows how it can be strengthened.
Only minor details in the proof need to be adapted when the set of acts is a set between p and Fh. Availability of simple acts was all that was needed in the proof. Under CEU, thus also under SEU, we see that, by restriction to constant acts, continuity of CU implies continuity of the utility function. Conversely, continuity of the utility function implies continuity of the functional, mainly by uniform continuity of the utility function when restricted to an appropriate compact set. q Appendix B: General outcome sets For simplicity of presentation, we have formulated the results for the case where the outcome set is R. This appendix shows how to adapt the results to the case where the outcome set is any connected topological space. Let us first discuss a problem that may arise if there are maximal and/or minimal outcomes. Then it may happen that the representing functional CU is "driven to infinity," i.e., assigns value m to maximal acts, and/or value --to to minimal acts. Being a ratio scale, CU then necessarily is an extended representation. The following example illustrates: CNEW SO0 HONG/PETER WAKKER Example Bl. Let the set of outcomes be [-l,l] , fi = {w,, . . . . w,,} (n i_ 3), > is represented by I=:=, xi 1 (w,) H (x,,,,+ I)Xexp(x,,,,) X. .X exp (x,,,,) , with x,(,, 2 ... L x,(,) (see Example 3.8 in Wakker, 1993a ). An extended CU-representation is obtained by taking logarithm: the act constant -1 gets assigned value -co; other acts get assigned value Mk, 1) + 11) + x,(~) + ... + x,(,,), for x,,(,) 1 ... 2 x,(,,). Note that W(-l,A) = --a, for all essential, (i.e., nonempty) A. Since CU and Ware ratio scales, there does not exist a real-valued CU-representation.
Let us now, similarly to appendix 2 in Wakker (1994) show how to adapt Theorem 2 to general outcome sets. We will continue to use the notation EJ", x,lAj for the simple act assigning outcome x, to A, for each i. In general, 2_ on outcomes is replaced by the preference relation > restricted to the constant acts. Equalities x = y are sometimes replaced by equivalences x N y. We assume that replacement of outcomes by other equivalent outcomes does not affect preference. For an adaptation of Theorem 1 this would have to be made explicit; for the adaptation of Theorem 2 that we provide below, it will be implied by pointwise monotonicity, a condition that will be added. Thus, in the presence of joint monotonicity (now with y Z x instead of y > x), the ordering of outcomes is the same for all essential BW.
It was convenient (while not essential) for the derivations in this article, in particular for the uniqueness results, to let the representations have the value 0 at 0. Hence, for a general outcome set, we fix one outcome x0, called neutral, at which the representation and the outcome-dependent capacity will be given the value 0. The neutral outcome should be neither maximal nor minimal to avoid the problems of being driven to infinity at this outcome; that would preclude normalization at 0.
An act f is bounded (in preference) if there exist outcomes u,u such that [Vo E R : u =S f(o) d u]. Certainty equivalents need no longer be uniquely determined. The choice between them is always immaterial. Acts are required to be measurable: the inverses of sets of outcomes of the form (x : x > y} and {x : x 6 y} should be events. In the presence of continuity of 3, measurability with respect to any algebra containing the topology on the outcome set will ensure this.
Supnorm-continuity cannot be defined in this general setting. One solution, which we inferred from Chateauneuf (1990) , is to assume, somewhat less generally, that the outcome set is a separable connected metric space. Alternatively, one may make explicit the implications of (supnorm-)continuity needed in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. These implications are as follows. On F", one imposes simple continuity, which requires the restriction of ?= to any FrJ to be continuous with respect to the product topology there. This (and the possibility to replace outcomes by indifferent outcomes without affecting preference) is all that is needed to adapt Theorem 1. On P, the analogous simple continuity of CU is, by Lemma Al, equivalent to supnorm-continuity if the outcome set is R.
On Fb, more implications of supnorm-continuity are needed. First, we add pointwise monotonic&y explicitly and assume the existence of a certainty equivalent for each f E Ab. Then we impose a "simple-act denseness" condition to guarantee that the CU-value of an act is indeed the infimum of the CU-values of pointwise dominating simple acts, as well as the supremum of pointwise dominated simple acts: We say simple-act denseness holds if, for all f > h, there exists a simple act g such that f > g z h, where g pointwise dominates h, and a simple act g' such that f z g' > h where g' is pointwise dominated byJ An analogous condition is defined for CU. That the added restriction about pointwise dominance of g above is appropriate may appear from its necessity in the adaptation of Lemma 3, needed for the derivation of comonotonic independence. Next we define an Archimedean axiom that precludes the phenomenon of driven-to-infinity, illustrated in Example Bl. Let II = {A,;.., A,,} be an ordered partition. A sequence of outcomes a',ci2,... is a standard sequence on event A, in Ffi' if there exist x,i # j, and nonequivalent outcomes v,, uji such that (denoting only the outcomes for events A, and A,, assuming other outcomes identical to those of x) (vi, ok) N ( MB~, (Y '+ ' ) for all k = 1,2,. ., with furthermore all acts in question contained in Ff. We call (Y', (Y', .. a second-order standard sequence on A,, in Fy if for every k there exists a standard sequence (p' , p2, . ..) on A, in Fy, such that for some m, I E IN, ok N B"', oh+' -B"" ', and 01'~' N p"'+", The second-order Archimedean axiom requires that a second-order standard sequence be finite whenever it is bounded (i.e., there exist outcomes u and v that are preferred and dispreferred, respectively, to each element of the sequence). Wakker (1993a) showed that the axiom is necessary and sufficient to preclude the driven-to-infinity phenomenon (and that a regular "first-order" version is not).
Theorem Bl. Suppose the set of outcomes is a connected topological space with a fixed (neutral) outcome x0 that is neither maximal nor minimal, and that there exist three disjoint essential events. The following two statements are equivalent for > on Fh, the set of bounded measurable acts: (9 k is represented by a pointwise monotonic, simple-continuous, simple-act dense functional CU. On P, CU is of the form i xjlA, -i {W(+ U;=, A;) -W(x,, U;:; Ai)} ,= I ;= I forx, * '.. Zx Here W is an outcome-dependent capacity ( W(.x"J) = W(x,0) = 0 for all A and x\ that is jointly monotonic.
(ii) Z= satisfies joint monotonicity on F", transitivity, completeness, pointwise monotonic&y, simple-continuity, the existence-of-certainty-equivalent condition, simple-act denseness, the second-order Archimedean axiom, and comonotonic independence (comonotonic sure-thing principle).
ProojY For the implication (i) j (ii), we make a few comments. For the certainty equivalent condition, note that by pointwise monotonic&y, there exists a dominating and dominated constant act for every bounded act $ By continuity of CU on constant acts (as implied by simple continuity) and connectedness, f has a certainty equivalent. For the proof of comonotonic independence, we shortly comment on the proof of (the analogue of) Lemma 3. For h = fy,g,g', one now takes a sequence of simple acts ti such that h pointwise dominates M"'c ' and h'+ ' pointwise dominates ti for all j, and CV(w) converges to CU(h). By simple-act denseness, such hi exist. The other parts of the implication (i) * (ii) are straightforward. Next we assume that (ii) holds, and derive (i). First the CU-representation on P is derived. We adapt the proof of (ii) * (i) of Theorem 1 given in appendix A. Lemma A2, ensuring the existence of certainty equivalents for simple acts, is now derived from Wakker (1989, Lemma VI.6 .1) and connectedness. For every partition containing at least three disjoint essential events, now, by Theorem 3.3.C (instead of Corollary 3.6) of Wakker (1993a) , a cardinal additive representation v" is obtained on Fy. Again, such representations are subsequently obtained on all essential partitions. We take any nonmaximal outcome (existing by continuity and connectedness) x' > x0, and let all additive representations assign value 0 to the act constant x0, and value 1 to the act constant x'. With these modifications, the representation on F" results. The extension to Fh requires no further comments. q The, somewhat complicated, second-order Archimedean axiom in statement (ii) above is only needed for maximal or minimal outcomes. If there exist maximal outcomes but no minimal outcomes and the second-order Archimedean axiom is dropped, then only a minor adjustment is required to permit an extended representation. It is then possible that for the maximal equivalence class of acts (containing the acts that assign maximal outcomes to each state of nature, and acts that do so except on an inessential event) the CU value must be m For all nonmaximal acts the CU value then is finite. The representation in terms of the outcome-dependent capacity in Theorem B 1 .(i) can then be maintained if W&4) is infinite whenever x is maximal and A" is inessential, and if the convention is adopted that terms m -~0 are zero (such terms occur only for the events A,,..., Aj such that A, U . ..U AJ is inessential).
If the second-order Archimedean axiom is dropped and there exist minimal outcomes, the case is more complicated. Then for the minimal equivalence class of acts (containing the acts that assign minimal outcomes to each state of nature, and acts that do so except on an inessential event) the CU value can be --oo. The representation in terms of the outcome-dependent capacity in Theorem B 1 .(i) then cannot be maintained for acts for which the minimal outcome occurs (for the other acts it can be). The reason is that W(xJ1) in Formula (A8) must be --tsr as soon as x is minimal and A is essential. Then in the summation in Theorem Bl .(i) terms m -~0 occur that cannot be defined as 0. The cumulative method of summation of the outcome-dependent capacity-differences turns out to be less convenient for minimal outcomes than for maximal outcomes. If one is willing to give up the convention that the representations are zero at the prespecified neutral outcome, then there is a way for maintaining the representation in terms of the outcome-dependent capacity in Theorem Bl .(i); we inferred this method from Chateauneuf (1995, personal communication) . If then a minimal outcome x exists, one sets W&4) = 0 for all events A such that A' is essential. Only if A' is inessential, one sets @x0, A) = 0 for a neutral outcome x0 that is strictly perferred to the minimal outcome. Then the convention 00 -~0 = 0 always gives the right results in the summation.
Finally, let us note that Remark Al can be extended to separable arc-connected outcome spaces by Gorman (1968) , and to separable connected outcomes spaces by von Stengel's (1991) 
